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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1961 Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), introduced
the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in the Department of
Defense (DOD). "The general idea is that budgetary decisions should be made by
focusing on output categories like governmental goals, objectives, and end products
instead of inputs like personnel, equipment, and maintenance" [Ref. I:p.l86]. A
systematic analysis of programs is necessary for effective decision-making.
Systematic analysis . . . {forges} links between general values and specific
program characteristics. It forges these links, first, by determining social
production functions that relate program inputs to program outputs, and,
second, bv translating general values into operationally specific objectives against
which outputs can be evaluated. [Ref. 2:p./4]
The objective of PPBS is to enable top "civilian" management to link programs to
money through systematic analysis. However, many writers on budget theory believe
that PPBS cannot work. They argue that all alternatives must be investigated for all
programs. Furthermore, all programs within the government must be compared to
determine the best use of a budget dollar. Program budgeting's greatest fault is man's
limited ability to make a comprehensive analysis of all the programs and alternatives
under consideration.
Aaron Wildavsky proposes aids to help budget reviewers analyze budgets. The
chief aid to budget calculation is incrementalism, or "the largest determining factor of
the size and content of this year's budget is last year's budget" [Ref. I:p.l2j.
Incrementalism is not the only budgeting strategy available to budget participants.
Two closely related strategies are maintenance of the "base" and "fair share." Under
the fair share strategy a claimant "... will receive some proportion of funds, if any,
which are to be increased or decreased below the base of the various governmental
agencies" [Ref. l:p. 17]. Maintaining the base is less of a strategy than an expectation
that programs will be maintained close to current budget levels [Ref. l:p. 17].
This study is based on the work that Lance Leloup and William Moreland
conducted utilizing Department of Agriculture (DOA) data between 1946 to 1971.
Incrementalism, maintaining the base, and fair share budgeting theories maintain that
stability is a dominant characteristic of the budgeting process. Leloup and Moreland
questioned the stability of the budgetary process. They studied agency budget requests
to the DOA to determine if stability at the departmental level was hiding irregularities
at the component stages. They found several roles and strategies used by budget
participants not proposed by traditional budgeting theorists.
1. Agencies do not pursue a unitary strategy of moderation in the budget process.
2. The most assertive agencies received the largest cuts in their budget requests,
but still came away" with the most substantial, nonincremental changes in
appropriations.
3. The role of the DOA appears to be more oriented towards, "balancing the
extremes" of the agencies requests.
4. The role of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) emerges as one
primarily concerned with reducing requests. Also, OMB appears to be the main
obstacle to agency budget growth.
5. Congress cuts large requests most severely but large requests result in greater
absolute growth for the requesting agency. [Ref. 3:pp.l8>189]
This study attempts to determine if the conclusions that Leloup and Moreland made
about DOA could also be made about the Department of the Navy (DON), or if
traditional budgeting theories more accurately describe the DON budgeting process.
This thesis analyzes the ability of budget participants to use program budgeting
as a rational alternative to incremental budgeting. Using data supplied by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) for fiscal year (FY) 1987, the Operations
and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) appropriations account was explored. The
strategies and roles used by the four major participants (Major Claimants,
NAVCOMPT, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and OMB) in the DON
budget process were postulated. This thesis is limited due to the following two factors:
past budget data is not available at the major claimant level and only the 0&M,N
account is analyzed.
After analyzing the data supplied by NAVCOMPT, an attempt to explain the
DON budgeting process is made by answering the following questions. If a claimant
requests more funds, will it receive more funds? What effect does NAVCOMPT have
on the budget process? Is NAVCOMPT neutral when acting on budget requests or
does it carry out the role of moderator? Is there a definite cutting bias in the joint
review conducted by OSD and OMB? What is the best predictor of this year's budget
levels? And finally, how well does incrementalism, maintaining the base, and fair share
budgeting theories explain claimant budget changes?
Chapter II provides additional background on budget strategies and roles of
budget participants, their ability to use PPBS, and a summary of the DON budget
process. Chapter III presents the data and the study conducted to make comparisons
of various budgeting behaviors. Chapter IV concludes the thesis with an assessment of
the various roles and strategies used in the DON budgeting process.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ROLES, STRATEGIES AND PROGRAM BUDGETING
Major claimants, NAVCOMPT, OSD, and OMB all have responsibilities to carry
out during the budgeting process. By adopting predictable patterns of behavior, the
participants can limit their areas of budget responsibility. Wildavsky suggests that a
claimant's proper role is that of an advocate. Budget reviewers expect agencies to pad
their budget request, while at the same time being careful not to overstate their needs
[Ref. l:pp.21,23]. As long as claimants can be expected to ask for all they need, plus a
little extra, the budget reviewers only have to worry about where to cut a budget
request. Otto Davis, Michael Dempster, and Wildavsky state that OMB "... acts . . .
with a cutting bias" towards all programs [Ref. 4:p.530]. These budgetary roles are
basically the same as proposed by LeLoup and Moreland minus the departmental role
[Ref. 3]. According to this model, NAVCOMPT should take on the departmental task
of stabilizing the claimant's budget requests. OMB, along with OSD, retains the role
of budget cutter.
Strategies are developed by budget participants to protect their interests "...
ordinarily neglected in the political system" [Ref. I:p.l73]. The process of "muddling
through" has been proposed as a method to assist man's limited cognitive powers in
the budgeting process. To simplify complex decisions, muddling through suggests "...
it is necessary only to study those respects in which the proposed alternative and its
consequences differ from the status quo" [Ref. 5:p.84j. Wildavsky has proposed other
aids to budget calculation, in addition to incrementalism. Budget participants use past
budget experience to modify previous consequences as necessary. Budget reviewers
"strain at gnats" and attack only budget areas they understand. And budget officials
"satisfice" by choosing not the best alternative but definitely not the worst
[Ref. l:pp. 1 1,12]. An expansionist strategy by a claimant is assertiveness.
"Assertiveness may be defined as the tendency for agencies to pursue an active strategy
of expansion in their programs and fundings" [Ref. 3:p. 182]. An assertive strategy is
not available to all claimants. A claimant must have a continuing political mandate to
achieve an increasing share of the budget.
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Reviewing authorities have strategies not available to claimants. Reviewing
authorities can specialize in areas to become experts in a field, concern themselves with
only small parts of a budget request, make marginal adjustments to existing programs,
and realize that they will never be able to solve all the problems with a budget, so why
try [Ref. l:pp.57-60].
A proponent of program budgeting can logically argue that roles and strategies
used by budget participants are unnecessary. It should simply be decided which ends
are to be achieved, and then the best alternative to reach the desired goal should be
implemented.
But budget officials soon discover that ends are rarely agreed upon, that they
keep changing, that possible consequences of a single policy are too numerous to
describe, and that knowledge of the chain of consequences for other policies is
but dimly perceived for most conceivable alternatives
[
Ref. l:pp. 147-148].
Charles Lindblom has stated that "non-incremental policy proposals are . . . typically
not only politically irrelevant but also unpredictable in their consequences"
[Ref. 5:p.85].
Why look beyond incrementalism to explain budgeting? Charles Schultze states
that "while incremental decisions make up by far the largest proportion of
governmental decisions, they do not encompass the universe of decisions" [Ref. 2:p.77].
Schultze and others state that incrementalism merely covers up the considerable
variation in funding levels of programs. Incrementalism shows stability at the
aggregate level, but fails to show the instability at the component level.
[Refs. 2,6,3:pP.77,955&962,180&181]
If incrementalism does not explain the entire budgeting process, can program
budgeting help explain the variations between program funding levels? First, what is
program budgeting?
The hallmarks of the program budget^ . . . are (1) restructuring of the budget in
terms of intermediate outputs or missions, and (2) the presentation of proposed
costs for several years ahead. [Ref. 7:p.20]
Program budgeting allows top-level determination of what objectives to achieve. Once
the objectives have been chosen, low-level managers provide cost information necessary
to achieve the objectives. Program budgeting directly associates the "ends" with the
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"means" to achieve them [Refs. 2,8,9:pp.38,25,50]. PPBS in DOD allows the nation's
political leaders to compare defense needs among all competing claimants.
The PPB(S} process can be summarized briefly: (a) Collect intelligence, (b)
Appraise the threat, (c) Based on national policy, develop strategy to meet the
threat, (d) Determine force levels to support the" strategy, (e) Program weapon
systems, manpower and support over a period of time to attain fiscally
constrained force levels. (0 Budget annual allocations of funds to procure men
and materials required to carry out programs. [Ref. 10:p. I- 1
]
The defenders of PPBS point to budget analysts who are "... champions of
efficiency and effectiveness as criteria in decision making" [Ref. 2:p.l01]. PPBS has
allowed policy objectives to be coordinated into the budget cycle [Ref. ll:p.3]. David
Novick and others state that program budgeting has allowed budget participants to use
the old budget strategy of incrementalism to evaluate programs in a new light. PPBS
remains incremental, but the trade-offs are based on a long range plan and are more
comprehensive in nature [Refs. 12,13:pp.90,94]. Schultze has defended program
budgeting as a necessary decision-making process:
Systematic analysis, applied to program evaluation, provides - for complex social
programs - the necessary feedback ingredient that justifies the incremental,
sequential, Lewis and Clark decision-making process [Ref. 2:p.64].
Critics of PPBS are many and quick to point out its flaws. PPBS "... did not
change budgetary decisions in DOD to any significant degree" [Ref. I :p. 195]. PPBS
had to conform to fiscal policies which caused a significant impact on its long range
programs. Wildavsky claims that "... only two of nine program categories used in
the Defense Department appear to be genuine programs in the sense of pointing to end
purposes or objectives" [Ref. 14:p.306]. Congress passes budgetary legislation by
appropriations accounts (e.g., 0&M,N) not by programs (e.g., Strategic Forces). The
indirect association between funding and programs obscures the policy implications of
a particular program. Therefore, "... program decisions {do} not imply budgetary
decisions" [Ref. ll:p.73]. Even if PPBS promotes efficiency within programs, it is
suggested that "... the program budget as such provides no clues to the effectiveness
or benefits from increments to alternative program elements" [Ref. 7:p. 134]. Without
establishing the marginal benefits available among programs, it is impossible to know
which program would create the greatest benefit from the next dollar increase in
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funding. Thus, there is no way to maximize the benefit of the defense budget.
Additionally, Charles Hitch, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
points ou^ that the "... programming phase regularly ran into, and overlapped with,
the budget review" [Ref. ll:p.75]. This action often caused serious program decisions
to be delayed until the budgeting phase of PPBS [Ref. ll:p.4].
Not only must PPBS be concerned with how to choose the best program, the
politics of which policy will be adopted must also be addressed [Refs. 14,15:pp.304,127].
Proponents point out that PPBS . . . does not seek to replace the political
decision-making process, it will- if successful -modify that process" [Ref. 2:p.34]. PPBS
would modify the system by presenting program choices "... aided by information
and technical analysis concerning the probable consequences of .... " choosing a
program [Ref. 8:p.51]. Therefore, "... program budgeting is a neutral tool. It has no
politics" [Ref. 16:p.370].
The attempt to substitute the efficiency criteria for political consensus causes
PPBS opponents to attack its political feasiblity. Lindblom would attack PPBS on the
grounds that it is " . . . an undesirable decision system .... A 'good' decision is one
which gains consensus rather than one which meets outside criteria of efficiency or
effectiveness" [Ref. 2:pp.36,52]. Budget officials are unable to absorb the entire
decision as a whole system. "... They cannot find any objective method of judging
priorities among programs" [Ref. I:p.l0]. The ability to consider the entire decision
process is contrary to Herbert Simon's theory of "bounded rationality" in
decision-making.
The first consequence of the principle of bounded rationality is that the intended
rationality of an actor requires him to construct a simplified model of the real
situation in order to deal with it. He behaves rationally with respect to this
model, and such behavior is not even approximately optimal with respect to the
real world. [Ref. 17:p.l99]
Again, the politician is unable to maximize the defense capabilities at a given level of
inputs. Even if the politician could maximize all programs, this behavior would "not fit
political reality" [Ref. 2:p.42].
It has been reported that not a " . . . single example of successful implementation
of PPB{S} ..." can be found [Ref. l:p. 196]. Furthermore, program budgeting has had
. . . little impact on the format or substance of the political debate" [Ref. 13:p.93].
Program budgeting is out of step with federal budgeting practice. "Federal budgeting
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today is incremental rather than comprehensive, calculated in bits and pieces rather
than as a whole, and veils policy implications rather than emphasizing them"
[Ref. I:pp.l35,136].
Is there a middle ground upon which program budgeting can operate effectively?
It may, indeed, be. necessary to guard against the naivete of the svstems analyst
who ignores political constraints and oelieves that efficiency alone produces
virtue. But it is equally necessary to guard against the naivete of the decision
maker who ignores resource constraints anii believes virtue alone produces
efficiency. [Ref. 2:p.76]
Program oudgeting is a forum for the debate of connecting ends to means. Program
budgeting lies in the middle ground between "purely incremental budgeting and an
annual zero-base review of all programs" [Ref. 2:p.81]. Even though a program output
cannot be measured precisely, it is still meaningful to determine if a program should be
increased, decreased, or remain the same. "If this is possible, the efficiency of the
program at any level can be examined separately" [Ref. 8:p.49]. Given today's
budgetary environment, a possible recipe for a successful PPBS would include
providing decision-makers with meaningful analysis of the issues under consideration.
This action would allow decision-makers to focus on marginal program changes,
therefore leaving the majority of budget decisions as incremental changes to last year's
budget.
B. DON BUDGETING PROCESS
PPBS is a budgeting technique. Until now, it has been described in broad general
characteristics. To appreciate the effect of PPBS on Navy budgeting decisions an
understanding of how it works within DON is required. The intent of this section is to
examine planning and programming only briefly. A more detailed analysis of DON
budgeting practices is conducted to determine what organizational roles and strategies
are mandated by DON officials.
DON operates under the PPBS rules promulgated by DOD. Basically, PPBS
operates on an eighteen month schedule "simultaneously budgeting for one year,
programming for the following year and planning for succeeding years " [Ref. 10:p.I-l].
The planning, programming, and budgeting phases are brought together in DOD by
updating the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) through the Program Objective




PPBS for DON starts at the highest levels in the government. Planning " with
the assessment of the threat to the security of the US and, when combined with
national policy, culminates in the development of force objectives to assure the security
of the United States" [Ref. 10:p.II-l]. The President, National Security Council,
SECDEF, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Operational Commander-in-Chiefs, service
secretaries, and others make threat assessments. The input of the JCS into the
planning phase, the Joint Strategic Planning Document, is a key starting point for
placing national objectives into a military strategy [Ref. 10:p.1 1-8]. Strategies to meet
the threat are translated into program elements (PE). "The PE is the basic building
block of the FYDP. It describes the mission to be undertaken, identifies the
organizational entities who will perform the mission assignment, and estimates costs"
[Ref. 18:p.3-l].
TABLE 1
MAJOR PROGRAMS IN DOD
1- Strategic Forces
2- General Purpose Forces
3- Intelligence & Communications
4- Airlift & Sealift
5- Guard & Reserve Forces
6- Research & Development
7- Central Supplv & Maintenance
8- Training, Medical, & Other Personnel Activities
9- Administrative & Associated Activities
0- Support of Other Nations
Table 1 identifies the ten major programs in which all program elements are distributed
[Ref. 10:p.A-l].
To make planning useful, fiscal constraints must be considered. SECDEF
provides each military department with fiscal guidance. This guidance "... is arrayed
in a programmatic format ... for which the FYDP program elements are the basic
building blocks" [Ref. 19:p.II-I]. Using SECDEF guidance, the military departments
propose defense programs to meet national objectives. This is an interactive process
with OSD which results in the Defense Guidance (DG). "The DG serves as an
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authoritative statement of the fundamental strategy, issues and rationale underlying the
Defense programs as seen by leadership of the Department" [Ref. 20:p.2-4]. The DG is
not only a military strategy document, it also provides fiscal guidance to military
departments. Using the FYDP as a baseline, the DG requires three budget levels to be
identified: minimum, basic, and enhanced [Ref. 10:pp.II-l 1,12 & 1 1 1-3]. After the DG
has been issued by SECDEF, the military departments are ready to start the
programming phase of PPBS.
2. Programming
The purpose of programming is to " . . . translate Department of the Navy
approved concepts and objectives into a definitive structure expressed in terms of
time-phased resource requirements including personnel, monies and material"
[Ref. 10:p. 1 1 1- 1]. The basic output of the process is the POM. The Navy POM is
developed in three phases: the planning phase, the program formulation phase, and the
final development phase [Refs. 10, 21:pp. 111-7,5].
During the planning phase, the Navy translates the DG into meaningful
objectives. The DON Policy and Planning Guidance injects Navy influence into the
DG [Ref. 18:pp.3-2,3-3]. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Policy and Planning
Guidance lays out the CNO's "... ground rules for the development of more detailed
alternative ways of meeting ..." the DG objectives [Ref. 10:p. 11-13]. The CNO
Program and Fiscal Guidance (CPFG) provides fiscal and manpower guidance to
develop the CNO Program Analysis Memorandum (CPAM) and the initial policy
guidelines for the FOM development. The CPAM assesses the "... Navy's capability
to carry out overall goals and objectives ..." proposed in the approved FYDP
[Ref. 10:p. Ill- 10]. CPAMs are developed for several issue areas. Anti-Submarine
Warfare, Strike and Amphibious Warfare, and General Support and Logistics are
examples of recurring CPAM issues. "Claimants and other interested organizations are
invited to submit issues of Navy-wide interest which address major resource allocation
or policy issues . . . during the summer months preceding the CPAM"
[Ref. 10:p.III-10]. After a review by the Program Development Review Committee, the
CNO Executive Board, and the SECNAV, Summary CPAMs I are released.
Completion of the Summary CPAMs I signals an end to the Navy planning phase of
programming. The Navy must now decide how to allocate resources to programs.
After the Summary CPAM I is issued, the CPFG II is released documenting
the CNO's CPAM decisions and providing fiscal guidance for Sponsor Program
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Proposals (SPPs). SPPs are developed by resource sponsors. A resource sponsor is " .
. . a Deputy CNO or Director, Major Staff Office responsible for an identifiable
aggregation of resources which constitutes inputs to warfare and supporting warfare
tasks " [Ref, 19:p.I-8].
The SPPs allocate the obligational authority provided to the Navy by the DG.
The resource sponsors are granted a grea't deal of flexibility concerning the
manner in which they program their priorities ("Directed Programs") as set forth
in CPFG and must balance at all levels (Min/Basic/Enhanced) within . . . fiscal
controls [Ref. 10:p.III-ll]
Major unresolved issues, SPPs, and CPAM decisions are presented in the Summary
CPAM II. The Summary CPAM II is reviewed by the same participants as the initial
CPAM. Program formulation concludes at the end of this review.
The final development phase begins when the CNO releases the Summary
CPAM II. After the Summary CPAM II issues are resolved, the resulting document
becomes the DON's POM, which is then ready to be submitted to SECDEF. The
POM is not simply the practice of matching programs with the DG, it is " . . . also the
primary means of requesting revisions to the SECDEF approved programs as
published in the FYDP" [Ref. 10:p.1 1 1-5]. This action by the services causes SECDEF
to re-evaluate the FYDP after the POMs are submitted. The JCS review the services'
POMs and issue the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM), which is a risk
assessment of the POMs developed under fiscal constraints [Ref. 10:p.1 1 1- 1 ]. Using an
interal DOD review and the JPAM, SECDEF issues the Program Decision
Memorandum (PDM), which is the final fiscal guidance for programs within each
service. Once the PDM is received by DON, the end game commences. The end game
is "... an interactive process involving program trade-offs to accommodate necessary
repricing of procurement programs and the establishment of appropriation controls to
enhance balance and budget feasibility" [Ref. 10:p.1 11-11]. Programming is completed
at the conclusion of the end game.
3. Budgeting
DON budgeting starts well before the programming phase has been
completed. The DON budget formulation process is a bottom-up affair that starts at
the ship or shore activity level and proceeds up the chain of command to the
appropriate headquarters level which reports directly to the CNO [Ref. 20:p.2-27].
Budget formulation is facilitated by a "budget call" document that provides "...
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substantive guidance and technical direction for all stages of the budget formulation
process" [Ref. 20:p.l-23]. The initial budget call is received from NAVCOMPT while
POM issues are still being debated at SECDEF level. NAVCOMPT must base its
budget call guidance on Congressional, OMB, OSD, and Secretary o[ the Navy
(SECNAV) actions [Ref. 20:p.l-23]. However, low-level commands must start
gathering budget information months prior to the NAVCOMPT budget call.
[Ref. 20:p.2-27].
Once the POM is completed, NAVCOMPT issues detailed control numbers
for final budget submission to the appropriate claimants [Ref. 19:p. 1 1-2]. These control
numbers, budget allowances by type of expenditure, are based on " . . . the first year of
the POM FYDP, as modified by the PDM . . . . " [Ref. 20:p.2-2]. Utilizing control
numbers "NAVCOMPT . . . prescribe! s} tne content and format for budget estimates
and promulgate^} the required budget relationship to the POM . . . . " [Ref. 13:p.IV-4].
This document is the formal budget call from NAVCOMPT.
The individual commands must use the budget call information to submit
budget estimates to their claimants, who in turn submit budget estimates to
NAVCOMPT. Budget estimates will be prepared and submitted based on the
approved program as well as economic assumptions related to pay and pricing policies
which will be contained in separately prescribed detailed budget guidance [Ref. 22:p.8].
Pricing changes are based on guidance supplied by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller) and "fact-of-life" changes at the command level
[Refs. 23, 19:pp.212-2, 11-29]. Reviewing authorities are very interested in the yearly
changes of budget requests. For example, the Bureau of Naval Personnel requires all
commands submitting budgets to " . . . identify and explain all program increases,
decreases and realignments between prior year and current year {budgets}"
[Ref. 24:Encl(2) p.5]. NAVCOMPT, OSD, OMB and Congress require claimant
submissions "to display a summary of dollar and program changes, by type of
purchase, for O&M appropriations" [Ref. 19:p.B-66]. It is not prohibited for programs
not identified in the FYDP POM to be included in a budget estimate; however, the
change must represent a "newly emergent critical unfunded deficienc{y} which cannot
be absorbed within controls" [Ref. 19:p.1 1-29].
One of the foundations of PPBS, economic analysis, is not completely
forgotten during budgeting. NAVCOMPT's policy is not to perform economic analysis
on all programs, but to limit analysis to specific areas where it will contribute to the
decision-making process [Ref. 20:p.2-6]. DOD conducts cost/benefit analysis for
programs meeting the following criteria: (1) the first time funding appears in the
FYDP, and (2) when estimated funding requirements are significantly altered by
program changes or projected plans [Ref. 23:p. 212.1].
After the claimants accumulate and review individual commands' budget
estimates, they submit their budget estimates to NAVCOMPT. Upon receiving the
claimants' budget requests, NAVCOMPT conducts its budget review.
This is an in-depth review of all Navy appropriations and programs to identify
problems and realign budget estimates as necessary to improve the overall
budgeting of DON resources, and to make necessary adjustments to
DON-approved programs in order to remain within adjusted financial levels
provided by SECDEF. [Ref. 20:p. 1-23]
NAVCOMPT has no responsibility to make program decisions [Ref. 20:p.2-31].
NAVCOMPT's reviewing responsibilities are to evaluate budget estimates on the
following criteria:
(1) Appropriation and fiscal status and implications, (2) financial feasibility and
balance, (3) validity and reasonableness of cost and pricing, (4) validity and
relationship to planned objectives, and (5) legality. [Ref. 10:p.nl-7J
NAVCOMPT's recommended changes to a budget request are commonly referred to as
the "mark-up."
NAVCOMPT provides its budget reviewers with techniques to analyze
budgets. Reviewers are to judge estimates based on past experience, established
standards, program changes by SECDEF or Congress, pricing changes, and
employment trends [Refs. 19,20:p.II-133&II-134, 2-31]. NAVCOMPT states that the
0&M,N account should reflect incremental changes in funding. The analyst is told
that "to the extent that a program's obligation and/or expenditure rate in the prior year
deviates significantly from the past appropriation pattern, a funding profile problem is
indicated" [Ref. 19:p.II-134]. Another interesting rule of thumb for the budget analyst
is that he should "... make a 'downward bias' assessment when initially reviewing
program estimates . . . . " [Ref. 19:p. 11-132]. In fact, this initial downward bias has
been named the "Nemfakos Assumption," after a NAVCOMPT budget analyst.
A mark-up will become the final budget decision unless the claimant
challenges the mark-up with a reclama [Ref. 19:p. 11-131]. NAVCOMPT tells claimants
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that reclamas should "... address the specific issue and rationale used in the
Mark-up" [Ref. 19:p.II-135]. NAVCOMPT allows reclamas to be submitted "...
based on differences in judgment ....." but these types of reclamas are frowned upon
since it could waste the sponsor's and the analyst's time [Ref. 19:p. 1 1- 1 35]. Differences
between NAVCOMPT and the claimant's budget will be resolved by the Director,
Navy Program Planning [Ref. 10:p.IV-5]. When all budget issues are resolved,
NAVCOMPT submits the final budget to OSD.
After receiving the budget estimate from DON, OSD and OMB conduct a
joint review of the Navy's budget. "On the basis of this review, tentative budget
decisions, Decision Package Sets (DPS), are made by SECDEF . . . . " [Ref. 10:p.IV-5].
SECNAV can respond to the DPS "... by submitting to SECDEF a position paper
or reclama prepared by the responsible DON organization" [Ref. 10:p.IV-5]. DPS
reclamas are discouraged by both DOD and SECNAV. General guidance is to submit
a reclama "... only if the impact is considered to be sufficiently serious to warrant the
personal reconsideration of the SECDEF" [Refs. 23,25:pp.219.2, Encl(l)p.lO].
After the Program Budget Decisions (PBD) are resolved, final control numbers
are issued by NAVCOMPT. This action marks the end of the Navy's PPBS for the
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Figure 2.1 The PPBS Process (Source: DON).
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III. DATABASE AND STUDY
A. THE DATABASE
The budget data for this study is an automated report produced by the
NAVCOMPT Budget Evaluation Group (NCBG). The report "Department of the
Navy; Operations and Maintenance, Navy; Review of the FY1987 Budget" [Ref. 26]
provides budget data for nineteen major DON claimants. Figure 3.1 identifies the
claimants and provides the claimant code used by NCBG.
The 0&M,N budget review report is divided into nine segments. Segment is
the claimant's budget in accordance with POM guidelines. Segment 1 contains
administrative corrections to the POM. Segments and 1 together represent the
claimant's total budget request submitted to NAVCOMPT. Segment 2 is
NAVCOMPT's mark-up of the claimant's budget. Segment 3 reflects claimant funding
changes caused by SECDEF's PDM. Segment 4 is an internal review conducted by
NAVCOMPT to bring budget submissions in line with the latest economic changes.
Segment 5 contains successful reclamas to NAVCOMPT's mark-ups. The summation
of Segments through 5 represents the budget submitted to OSD. Segment 6 is the
OSD/OMB mark-up of the budget. Segment 7 reflects successful reclamas to the
OSD/OMB mark-up. Segment 8 is a miscellaneous section to show NAVCOMPT
adjustments made during the OSD/OMB review. 1
The report, which was originally completed in the fall of 1985, contains seven
years of budget data, FY1985 to FY1991. Data after FY1987 represent predicted
budget levels for the claimant if the FYDP as currently stated is continued. These
years are not used in the study due to their predictive nature. FY 1985 data is used to
evaluate budget changes in preceding years. FY 1986 data is used in some analyses
since FY1986 budget changes do represent actual dollars to the claimants. However,
FY1987 provides the lion's share of data for this study's analyses. No attempt was
made to adjust the budget amounts for inflation. This is because inflation adjustments
were available only for FY1985; inflation adjustments for other years would be
predictions of questionable value.
! Mr. Wess McNair of the Office of Budget and Reports (NCB) provided
definitions for the various report segments via a telephone conversation.
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Claimants NCBG Code
Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09B) 11
Assistant for Administration,





Commander, Naval Medical Command 18
Naval Air Systems Command 19
Naval Military Personnel Command 22
Naval Supply Systems Command 23
Naval Sea Systems Command 24
Naval Facilities Engineering Command 25
Strategic Systems Project Office 30
Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics)/
Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command/ Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations
37
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 39








Naval Oceanographic Office 65
Naval Security Group Command
Headquarters
69
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet 70
Figure 3.1 Major DON Claimants.
The budget data presented in this study represents an approved budget through
SECDEF. Many budget changes occur before the budget is finalized. These include
Presidential changes, new economic adjustments, and Congressional budget changes.
Also, the summation of the claimants' budget requests does not fully represent the
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budget approved by SECDEF. The 0&M,N account total is different because
NAVCOMPT maintains five administrative accounts which have zero or negative
ending balances. These administrative accounts are not considered in the study.
B. THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to contrast the traditional budgeting theories
proposed by Wildavsky and Lindblom with the results Leloup and Moreland found at
the DOA [Ref. 1 1]. Budgeting theories are tested against the database to help illustrate
the budgeting process within DON.
TABLE 2
TOTAL 0&M,N BUDGET LEVELS BY CLAIMANT
all numbers in 000'
s
NCBG code FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987
11 971,670 1,069,378 930,137
12 180,097 187,749 210,154
15 125,940 141,617 147,166
18 740,885 775,873 805,220
19 2,996,723 2,773,706 2,571,766
22 317,002 475,613 526,546
23 1,321,636 1,274,620 1,357,512
24 3,943,737 4,413,566 4,704,803
25 341,087 406,592 389,756
30 813,641 844,088 928,042
37 283,436 57,083 62,217
39 661,236 756,692 834,491
60 5,748,726 5,634,938 5,702,113
61 138,526 145,026 178,038
62 995,427 1,039,255 1,050,080
63 359,423 371,749 376,455
65 182,870 215,963 207,792
69 75,724 79,071 89,026
70 5,292,009 5,343,525 5,393,803
1 ls.0
Table 2 provides the data to make judgements about the claimants use of
incrementalism, fair share budgeting, and the ability of each claimant to protect its
budget base.




To determine if incrementalism helps explain the DON budgeting process, a
model developed by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky is used [Ref. 4:p.533]. The model





t_j + p t (eqn 3.1)
x
t
= budget request of a claimant
Ba = slope of the budget request line
x
t_| = previous year's budget request
p t = a random variable
The claimants' budget totals in FY 1986 were regressed against the FY 1985 budget
totals. The result:
FY1986= 1.00FY i985 + 22683
R-square = 99.4%
The claimants' budget totals in FY1987 were regressed against the FY1985 budget
totals. The result:
FY1987= 1.02FY i986 + 3198
R-square = 99.7%
R-square is the coefficient of determination, which indicates the proportion of x
t
variability explained or accounted for by x
t_j [Ref. 28:p.424].
The high R-square values for the DON budget, FY 1985 through FY 1987,
reveals that next year's budget result is highly related to the previous year's budget.
This finding indicates strong support for incremental budgeting within DON.
2. Fair Share
To determine if budget participants retain a fair share of the DON budget, a
model suggested by James Danziger is used as a guide. "The fair share model is based
on a constant percentage of change in total expenditures, and estimates the changes in
service expenditures as a function of the change in total expenditures" [Ref. 15:p.l33].
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This model predicts this year's changes in budget allocation by multiplying the
claimant's previous proportion of the budget by the total change in expenditures.
A Allo
t
Claimant; = p (Allot.j A TEC) + a (eqn 3.2)
A Alio* Claimant^ = change in the claimant's budget level
P = slope of the budget line
Allo^j = last year's budget proportion
A TEC = change in total 0&M,N expenditures
a = random variable




Claimant; = 0.225(AlloFY1986 A TEC) + 22683
R-square (adjusted) = 0.0%
The same analysis was conducted on the FY1986 and FY1987 budgets. The result:
A Allo
t
Claimant; = 0.868(AlloFY1 987 A TEC) + 31987
R-square (adjusted) = 2.9%
R-square values are very low. Fair share changes to the claimant's budget
levels are not related to the actual budgeting outcomes in DON. Claimants do not
maintain their proportional share of incremental budget changes.
3. Budget Base
Budget participants expect their programs to be maintained close to the
current funding levels. To evaluate this expectation, a linear model developed by
Danziger is used. "Operationalizing the base as the proportion of total expenditure
allocated to Service;
,
this model assumes that the change pattern will maintain an
allocation as a constant percentage of total expenditure" [Ref. 15:p. 133]. To use this
model, last year's budget proportions is multiplied by this year's 0&M,N budget to
predict a claimant's funding level.
Base Allo
t




= this year's percent budget share
P = slope of the line
BaseAllo
t_| = last year's percent budget share
a = random variable
Claimants' budgets for FY 1985 were divided by the total 0&M,N budget for FY 1985.
The same procedure was conducted on FY1986 budget data. Regression analysis was
conducted on the FY1986 findings using the FY1985 data as a predictor. The results:
Base FY1986 = 0.983(Base AlloFyi985 )+ 0.00087
R-square = 99.4%
The same analysis was conducted using the FY1986 and FY1987 budget data. The
result:
Base FY1987 = 0.998(Base AlloFY1986 )+ 0.00012
R-square = 99.7%
Again, R-square values are very high. The previous year's budget base has a
very strong relationship to the following year's budget base. The support for a base
determined budget is just as strong as the support for incremental budgeting. Budget
base and incrementalism R-square values are exactly the same independent of the
budgeting strategy attributed to the claimants. This result illustrates the high degree to
which incrementalism and budget base models are related.
The fair share model did not support the theory that budget participants
receive budget changes in proportion to their previous budget levels. The fair share
model is the only traditional budgeting model investigated that attempts to explain
budgeting behavior by investigating marginal budget changes. Incremental and budget
base models explain budget behavior by examining aggregate budget changes.
Apparently, the models based on aggregate spending levels are hiding the marginal
funding changes that are taking place among the claimants.
4. Leloup and Moreland Study
The Leloup and Moreland study attempts to prove that different agencies
receive different budget proportions based on their aggressiveness and the support they




TO NAVCOMPT FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR'S REQUES*
CLAIMANT ASSERTIVENESS: ASE IN CLAIMANT REQUEST
:sT
Request 0%- 5%- 10%- 15% & Total
Decrease 4.9% 9.9% 14.9% Above
10 3 17 3 5 38
agency requests to NAVCOMPT as a percentage change from the previous year's
budget request. 3 Interestingly, more claimants requested cuts from their budgets than
requested a budget increase greater than 10 per cent. The data suggests that most
claimants are moderate in their requests for additional funds.
To assess the impact of claimant assertiveness, the bivariate correlation
coefficients between the percent change in requests, the proportion of requests
approved, and the percent change in the final budget is analyzed. 4 Only the FY 1987
budget data was utilized to assess the correlation between the claimant's request,
budget changes by NAVCOMPT, budget changes by OSD/OMB, and the total change
in the budget. The highest correlation with the ultimate budget change is with the
change requested by the claimant (r=.505). There is also a positive correlation
between the changes made by OSD/OMB and the final budget (r=.404).
NAVCOMPT changes have almost no correlation with the changes in the final budget
(r=.050). Not surprisingly, the change in the budget requested by the claimant is
negatively correlated with NAVCOMPT changes (r= -. 136) and OSD/OMB budget
changes (r=s -.174). Caution must be used in inferring from this data that the most
important final budget determinant is the claimant's budget request.
30&M,N budget review report segments and 1 will always be combined to
reflect the budget request by a claimant.
40&M,N budget review report segments 2 through 5 will be used to show the
total changes made ov NAVCOMPT. Report segments 6 and 7 will be used to show
the total changes made by OSD/OMB.
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The bivariate correlation coefficients were also checked dependent on the
claimant's assertiveness and the reviewing body's support. Again, the correlation
between the change in claimant requests, proportion of the request approved by the
reviewing body, and the percent change in the final budget is the basis for analysis.
Assertiveness in a budget request is set at 10 per cent. Reviewing body support is
indicated by not cutting the budget request. 5 Research data for FY 1986 and FY 1987 is
used to establish the correlation coefficients.
An assertive claimant's budget request is negatively correlated with the budget
result (r=-.868) if NAVCOMPT's support is received. The claimant's budget request
is significantly related to the final budget. The proportion of the request approved by
NAVCOMPT is highly correlated to the final budget result (r=.980). NAVCOMPT's
budget action is a more reliable determinant of the claimant's final budget than the
original budget request. NAVCOMPT's action suggests that it wishes to determine the
budget levels for an assertive claimant even if it supports the claimant.
For an assertive claimant receiving negative NAVCOMPT support, its highest
positive correlation to its final budget is the budget approved by NAVCOMPT
(r=.700). NAVCOMPT's budget action significantly determines the final budget. The
claimant's budget request correlation to the final budget is r= -.193. There is only a
small negative relationship between the budget requested and the final budget result.
The claimant's budget request is negatively correlated to the proportion of the request
approved by NAVCOMPT (r=-.757). Again, NAVCOMPT is attempting to dictate
budget outcomes, this time by making cuts.
A non-assertive claimant receiving NAVCOMPT support has a moderate
positive correlation with its budget request (r= .618) and proportion of the request
approved by NAVCOMPT (r=.547). The claimant's budget request is the strongest
determinant in the final budget. However, the relationship is not much different than
the proportion of the request approved by NAVCOMPT and its effect on the final
budget.
If a claimant is not assertive and receives negative NAVCOMPT support,
there is a very high correlation that the claimant's budget request accurately reflects
the final budget (r=.997). NAVCOMPT appears to let these claimants cut their own
budgetary throats.
5There was only one instance of high claimant assertiveness and high OSD/OMB
support, therefore, no correlation coefficients are possible for this observation.
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An assertive claimant with negative OSD/OMB support has a high correlation
between the proportion of request that is approved by OSD/OMB and its final budget
(r= .971). OSD/OMB has a strong desire to determine the budget outcome of these
claimants. A small negative correlation exists between its budget request and the final
budget (r=-.113). The claimant's request does not resemble its final budget.
A non-assertive agency with OSD/OMB support has a moderate positive
correlation with its budget request and the final budget (r=.457). Its request is
negatively correlated with the proportion of the request approved by OSD/OMB
(r = -.58 1). OSD'OMB's influence on the non-assertive claimant's budget is only
slightly stronger than the claimant's budget request.
Finally, a budget request by non-assertive agency with negative OSD/OMB
support is highly correlated to its final budget (r=.998). The final budget outcome is
only moderately correlated to the OSD/OMB action on its budget request (r=.204).
Like NAVCOMPT, OSD/OMB is willing to let these claimant's determine their budget
levels.
Caution must be used in interpreting these correlations; however, two general
observations can be made. First, reviewing bodies greatly influence the final budget
outcomes of assertive claimants. Second, reviewing bodies are willing to let
non-assertive claimants have greater control over their budgets.
Table 4 shows the changes in claimant requests made by NAVCOMPT and
OSD/OMB. 6 The effect of claimant assertiveness on budget outcome emerges.
Claimants which request a decrease in their budget are in for a substantial cut. A
claimant asking for a modest increase of less than 5 percent will find its budget being
cut. The most substantial budget increases occur with the group requesting 10 to 15
percent budget increase. The small number of claimants in this category make this
result statistically insignificant, when compared to the group requesting increases
greater than 15 percent. However, there is a difference in the average change in budget
requests of claimants asking for less than 10 percent budget increase when compared to
claimants requesting more than a 10 percent budget change.
H : \l Claimants Requesting < 10% = \i Claimants Requesting > 10%.
6Budget data for FY 1986 and FY 1987 was used to make Table 4 . The average
percent change bv NAVCOMPT is the total budget changes made by report segments
2, 3. 4, and 5. The average percent change by OSD/OMB is the total budget changes
made by report segments 6 and 7.
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TABLE 4
















Request Decrease 10 0.01 -0.03 -0.31
Increase 0-4.9% 3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
Increase 5-9.9% 17 0.01 -0.02 0.06
Increase 10-14.9% 3 0.09 -0.02 0.18
Increase > 15% 5 -0.01 -0.06 0.11
H Q can be rejected at a = .05. Probability of error is 0.0003.
Claimants which received the largest budget increases, asked for the largest increases.
NAVCOMPT's total budget behavior is independent of the budget changes
requested by claimants. Consistent with these findings, NAVCOMPT is not stabilizing
the claimants' budget requests as Leloup and Moreland found in their study.
Furthermore, NAVCOMPT's final budget outcome is just as likely to increase the
requested budget as to decrease the request.
H : ]i NAVCOMPT budget change =
H n cannot be rejected at any meaningful level of significance.
fi = 0.0004 Standard deviation = 0.0918
Since NAVCOMPT is not conducting across the board cuts or cutting budgets based
on the size of the increase requested, maybe the budget review techniques directed by
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NAVCOMPT are working as advertised. NAVCOMPT's budgeting role could be
simply checking claimants for budget feasibility, verifying the accuracy of estimates,
and evaluating if the budget reflects PPBS decisions.
As Leloup and Moreland found, "the patterns of cuts point to {OSD/JOMB as
a consistent obstacle..." to the claimant's budget expansion [Ref. 3:p. 185,186].
H : p OSD/OMB budget change £
H Q can be rejected at a = .05. T-value = -1.83. Chance of error is 0.042.
H = -0.0226 Standard deviation = 0.054
The role of OSD/OMB emerges as primarily a budget cutter. As in Leloup and
Moreland's study, moderation in budget requests appears to have no advantage in
securing support from the OSD/OMB budget review.
A different pattern of budget review behavior emerges when comparing
NAVCOMPT with OSD/OMB. NAVCOMPT acts with more variation then
OSD/OMB on claimant requests, as shown by the much greater standard deviation of
the NAVCOMPT budget actions when compared to OSD/OMB. "This suggests that .
. . (OSD/}OMB is more mechanical and regular in its budget cuts than . . . .
NAVCOMPT [Ref. 3:p.l86]. Claimants receiving the largest cuts from OSD/OMB
requested the largest budget increases. However, NAVCOMPT changes appear not to
be motivated by the size of the budget request. Apparently, reviewing bodies do not
cut the claimant's budget solely dependent on the size of the budget increase requested.
The above data appears not to support traditional budgeting theory.
Claimants which ask for budget increases get those increases. Moderation in budget
requests will result in either a small budget increase or decrease. The budget base of
the claimants is changing. And finally, claimants are obviously not receiving a
proportional share in all budget changes.
Figure 3.2 shows mean requests and appropriation patterns for the five
categories of assertiveness. 7 OSD/OMB behavior in the mark-up is very similar to its
final budget action. All categories of assertiveness receive negative support from
OSD/OMB during the mark-up. The most aggressive category received the largest cuts
during this phase.
Figure 3.2 chances to the claimants' budget requests, include only the original











































Figure 3.2 Request Patterns by Categories of Assertiveness.
The results of NAVCOMPT's original mark-up is much different than its final
budget action. NAVCOMPT's original budget mark-up has a decidedly negative bias.
H Q : Ave. NAVCOMPT mark-up is >
H Q can be rejected at a = .05. T-test = -2.20. The probability of error is 0.02.
The Nemfakos Assumption appears to be alive and well during the initial budget
mark-up.
Table 5 shows the average budget changes of claimants dependent on their
Q
assertiveness and the support they receive from the reviewing bodies. The largest
budget increases are achieved by the assertive claimants. Support by the reviewing
bodies helps maintain requested budget increases. However, no large increases in the
budget will occur without the claimant asking for an increase. An analysis of the
variance between the different group populations reveals that no statement about
group differences can be made conclusively.





































H Q cannot be rejected at a
2.92.
=
.05. F-ratio = 0.58. F-ratio necessary to reject H Q is
H Q :nF= flG= flH
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H Q cannot be rejected at a = .05. F-ratio = 0.70. F-ratio necessary to reject H Q is
3.32.
At this point, general observations on budgetary roles and strategies can be
theorized.
a. Claimants
Claimants "do not pursue a unitary strategy of moderation in the budgetary
process;" initial requests vary from severe cuts to significant increases in previous
budget levels [Ref. 17:p. 1 88J. Claimants' requests most closely resemble their final
budgets when they are requesting a budget decrease. Lastly, the average claimant asks
for more money.
H Q : Change in FY1986 budget request ^
H Q can be rejected at an a = .05. T-test = 5.22. The probability of error is less than
0.000.
b. NAVCOMPT
NAVCOMPT is not playing the role of "balancing the extremes," which
Leloup and Moreland found in DOA [Ref. 17:p.l88]. NAVCOMPT appears to be
basically a budget checker. The NAVCOMPT budget review has the same likelihood
of increasing as decreasing a claimant's budget request. However, the budget mark-up
will likely have a negative impact on the original budget request.
c. OSDjOMB
OSD/OMB does not appear to be the main obstacle to budget growth as
Leloup and Moreland found. A decreased budget is more likely the result of a
claimant's request than subsequent action by OSD/OMB. OSD/OMB is much more
likely to cut a budget than NAVCOMPT. OSD/OMB appears to be very mechanical
in their budget review with little variation in their actions. As Leloup and Moreland
found, there is no category of assertiveness for which OSD/OMB did not cut the
requested budget.
5. Other Roles and Strategies
The DON budgeting process is different from the budgeting processes
described by traditional budgeting theorists or Leloup and Moreland. This section will
discuss budgeting behaviors that are peculiar to DON. Only data from FY1987 is used
for the analyses.
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One major difference in the DON process is the two different budget mark-ups
that the DON budget experiences. Total budget changes during the two budget
mark-ups were discussed in the previous section; however, specific budget behavior was
not mentioned. Does NAVCOMPT or OSD/OMB make more budget cuts? Which
reviewing body restores more budget cuts? To test which reviewing body makes more
line-item cuts, the number of NAVCOMPT cuts is compared to the number of
OSD/OMB cuts.
H : ]l No. of NAVCOMPT cuts = \i No. of OSD/OMB cuts.
H Q cannot be rejected at a =.05. T-test = -0.10. The probability of error = 0.92.
H NAVCOMPT cuts = 43.8 \i OSD/OMB cuts = 44.7
Therefore, there is no meaningful difference in the number of NAVCOMPT cuts
compared to the number of OSD/OMB cuts. The percentage of line-item cuts restored
holds a different outcome.
H Q : \i Per cent NAVCOMPT restores line-items = \l Per cent OSD/OMB restores
line-items.
H Q can be rejected at a = .05. T-test = 5.72. There is almost no probability of error
with this statement.
H NAVCOMPT restorals = 0.398 \i OSD/OMB restorals = 0.168
Why are there more NAVCOMPT restorals when compared to OSD/OMB? First,
DOD and DON discourage reclamas to OSD/OMB cuts. Next, most OSD/OMB cuts
are conducted on line-items for which the claimant has very little input. OSD/OMB
makes a significant number of their cuts based on Congressional action, revised
services rates, revised economic assumptions, and repricing of commodities (i.e. fuel).
Finally, NAVCOMPT screens out the unsupportable budget requests.
If NAVCOMPT was successful in screening out the unsupported requests,
OSD/OMB should not have to make entire line-item budget changes. Therefore, it is
expected that OSD/OMB would make fewer 100 percent program restorals than
NAVCOMPT. But this does not occur.
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H : n 100% restorals NAVCOMPT per line-item restored = ]i 100% restorals
OSD/OMB per line-item restored.
HQ cannot be rejected at a = .05. F-ratio = 1.00. The required F-ratio to reject H Q is
4.17.
H 100% restorals NAVCOMPT = .1873
H 100% restorals OSD/OMB = .2500
How the two reviewing bodies restored cuts during the reclama process is also
interesting. NAVCOMPT actually gave back to claimants more than it took in the
mark-up. OSD/OMB gave back to claimants less than half of what was taken during
its mark-up. It cannot be stated conclusively, however, that NAVCOMPT gives
money back during the reclama process at a greater rate than OSD/OMB.
H Q : jii Per cent NAVCOMPT funds are restored = ^ Per cent OSD/OMB funds are
restored.
H Q cannot be rejected at a = .05. T-test = 1.30. T-test necessary to reject H Q is 1.316.
Projected error is 0.22.
H Per cent NAVCOMPT funds restored = 1.34.
H Per cent OSD/OMB funds restored = 0.48.
Based on the 100 percent restoral rate and the rate at which cuts are restored, it is
questionable that NAVCOMPT is successfully screening unsupported budget requests
before OSD/OMB submission. Additional data is necessary to substantiate this role
for NAVCOMPT.
Consistent with this data, the following general statements can be made
concerning NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB budget review behavior. Although
NAVCOMPT's original budget mark-up is downwardly biased, NAVCOMPT is willing
to make significant changes to its mark-up during the reclama process. NAVCOMPT
makes as many line-item cuts to budgets as OSD/OMB, but NAVCOMPT receives
significantly more reclamas to its cuts. NAVCOMPT probably receives more reclamas
because they restore more funds, and OSD/OMB cuts are made on more secure
political ground, and updated price and economic assumptions.
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The following section does not consider what roles and strategies are involved
in the budget process, but rather what budget actions have the most influence in
changing a claimant's budget. Multiple regression, stepwise regression, and simple
linear regression were conducted on many variables. Only the five variables that were
found with some predictive value are examined.
An obvious place to start is to determine if the claimant's request and
subsequent action by reviewing bodies predict budget changes. NAVCOMPT changes
are reflected in report segments 2 through 5. OSD/OMB changes are reflected in
report segments 6 and 7. A stepwise regression was conducted on these predictors with
the following results:
1. A change in the claimant's budget request is the best predictor of the budget
change. K-square from claimant action only is 25.52%.
2. The next best predictor is the changes requested by OSD/OMB. R-square
increases to 50.48% with the inclusion of OSD/OMB action.
3. Adding the changes made by NAVCOMPT increases R-square to 57.5%,
adjusted to 49.0%.
A less obvious relationship to budget changes is the rate at which the
NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB cuts are restored. Multiple and simple regression were
conducted on these predictores with the following results:
1. The percentage bv which cuts are restored by NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB is
a better predictor of the changes in budgets than budget changes requested by
claimants and subsequent actions by reviewing bodies. R-square adjusted is
55.4%.
2. The best single predictor is the rate at which OSD/OMB restores their cuts.
R-square adjusted is 35.8%.
This section does not help predict which claimant will receive an increased
budget next year. However, during the DON budgetary process the best determinant
of which claimant receives the greatest budget increase is the claimant which
successfully reclamas OSD/OMB cuts.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this thesis was to assess the ability of DON to utilize PPBS.
Roles and strategies of budget participants were first proposed as a means for them to
decrease the complexity of their tasks. During the study phase, a search was
conducted to highlight possible roles and strategies in use at DON. The extent to
which the traditional budgeting theories help explain the budgeting results in DON was
also investigated. This chapter combines these budgetary relationships in a final
assessment of the effectiveness of PPBS in DON.
Traditional budgeting theories of incrementalism, maintenance of a fair share,
and maintaining the budget base were assessed using models proposed by Wildavsky
and Danziger. The incremental and budget base models are very powerful in predicting
future budgetary outcomes and the models are elegant. However, problems exist with
these models. "John Wanat has argued persuasively that the 'success' of such models
usually reflects the mathematical domination of the new figure over the old figure and
that they provide little information about the actual nature of the incremental process"
[Ref. 15:p.l35]. The fair share model supports Wanat's argument. This model is based
on marginal budget changes. When the old figure was unable to dominant the new
figure, the fair share model failed to correctly predict changes in claimant funding
levels.
Wiluavsky also cautions against using his model to predict outcomes "...
because the budget process is only temporally stable for short periods. A sudden
change may be the result either of a change in the underlying process or a temporary
setting aside of the usual decision rules in light of special circumstances" [Ref. 4:p.542].
With this background, do incrementalism, fair share, and budget base help explain the
DON budgeting process? The easy answer is yes and no. These models help in
understanding the aggregate budget levels claimants receive, but the models do not
help explain which claimant will receive a budget increase or decrease next year.
Finally, the short time period to which this study was constrained may make the
predictive power of the incremental and budget base models appear much greater than
is actually the case.
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One of the leading arguments against program budgeting is the lack of roles and
strategies available to budget participants to simplify their tasks. During the study
various possible roles and strategies were investigated based on the work of Leloup and
Moreland. The study reveals that DON budget participants are using roles and
strategies during the budget process.
A. ROLES
1. Claimants
Claimants fill the advocacy role. This finding is consistent with traditional
and non-traditional budgeting theories.
2. NAVCOMPT
NAVCOMPT's original budget mark-up is biased downward, but its final
budget action is just as likely to result is a budget increase as in a budget decrease.
There is no evidence to suggest that NAVCOMPT attempts to moderate budget
requests. This outcome is different than what Leloup and Moreland found at DOA.
The outcome in DON suggests that claimants' budgets are the result of programmatic
decisions made at the SECNAV or SECDEF level. These decisions cannot be easily
altered by NAVCOMPT.
3. OSD/OMB
OSD/OMB has a decided cutting bias. The success of their budget actions
appears to be based on pricing revisions, new economic assumptions, and superior
political clout. During the FY1987 budgeting year, inflation was being brought under
control. The heavy negative bias attributed to OSD/OMB may be a by-product of a
lowering inflation rate, not a true indication of OSD/OMB's budgeting role. However,
budgeting theorists have consistently given OMB the role of budget cutter. There is no
evidence to refute this role for OSD/OMB within the DON budget process.
B. STRATEGIES
1. Claimants
The most important strategy available to a claimant is to ask for a budget
increase. Budget changes are most closely related to the budget requested by the
claimant than to the budget changes made by NAVCOMPT or OSD/OMB. The
support of the reviewing bodies helps maintain budget changes requested. But first a
claimant must request an increase or no budget increase will be forthcoming. Next,
claimants appear to be very willing to reclama cuts made by NAVCOMPT in
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comparison to cuts made by OSD/OMB. This suggests that claimants have a strategy
to fight NAVCOMPT changes while generally accepting OSD/OMB changes.
2. Reviewing Bodies
NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB have reviewing strategies that depend on the
claimant's assertiveness. The final budget change of an assertive claimant is most
dependent on the actions taken by the reviewing bodies. Changes in a non-assertive
claimant's budget request can be very accurately predicted by the original budget
request. Apparently, reviewing bodies have a strategy to restrict their budget reviews
to claimants requesting significant budget increases. This strategy allows them to
concentrate their efforts where they are most needed.
C. SUMMARY
The study tends to support PPBS as a rational decision-making process for
budgeting. However, pure program budgeting does not exist within DON. Obviously,
the budgets presented to NAVCOMPT are not directly related to programs. All
claimants have more than one major program element in their budgets. "As long as
some decisions are made in terms of specific input categories, cutting across program
elements, they can on occasion disrupt program budget system, vitiate particular
program change decisions, and cause considerable confusion" [Ref. 16:p.293]. Also,
PPBS is not a complete assessment of the costs and benefits of every program in DON,
much less DOD or the entire Government. NAVCOMPT's policy forces claimants to
submit explanations only to the extent that their budget has been changed from last
year's budget. The analysts of NAVCOMPT are told to look for incremental changes
from the previous year's budget. Therefore, incremental budgeting is the norm in
DON. Incremental budgeting does not correspond to the goal of a holistic analysis of
the cost effectiveness of every program in DON. Finally, if budgeting under PPBS was
simply a matter of costing out previously approved programs, an assertive claimant
would have the same probability of receiving a budget change from NAVCOMPT as a
non-assertive claimant. This does not happen. This is just a small list of why PPBS is
not "pure" program budgeting.
If PPBS is not "pure" program budgeting, what is the purpose of this complex
and costly system? PPBS allows top management to make "... broad, strategic,
budget decisions . . . . " [Ref. 2:p.93]. Although these decisions are marginally altered
as they proceed through the PPBS process, the basic decision is supported. PPBS also
41
allows participants to be selective in reviewing programs. "Selectivity in the issues
raised, in the programs reviewed, and in the range of alternatives examined is crucial to
the success of PPB{S}" [Ref. 2:p.80]. PPBS not only helps participants to be selective
in choosing issues, it helps keep analysts focused on marginal budget changes. This
action provides the analyst a key tool in determining if budget changes are caused by
program decisions or unwarranted claimant desires. Lastly, PPBS allows the majority
of budgeting decisions to be incremental changes. There is an expectation that budgets
will change incrementally unless a programmatic decision is made during the prior
phases of PPBS.
In summary, PPBS has evolved into a budgetary process in which participants
have developed roles and strategies to limit their responsibilities. "Muddling through"
and incrementalism are still very much part of the decision-making process. However,
NAVCOMPT and OSD/OMB have been able to isolate claimants to be supported
based on planning and programming decisions. The rationality of PPBS lies in its
ability to support the inherent rationality of traditional budgeting with meaningful
analysis to increase budget efficiency on the margin.
This study does not attempt to explain all facets of the DON budgeting process.
Future studies are necessary to achieve this objective. A good starting place for future
studies is to address the shortcomings of this study. The greatest drawback to this
study of the DON budgeting process is the short time period over which the study was
conducted. It would have been improved greatly if the data covered time periods with
different economic conditions, varying support of Defense programs, and a different
Presidential administration. The roles and strategies that were found in DON may
vary significantly dependent on these and other variables. In any case, more years
need to be analyzed to improve the study's time-series analyses. Looking at other
appropriations might also illustrate new and different strategies used within DON.
(Example: The funding cycle of Ship Construction is vastly different from the funding
cycle of the 0&M,N appropriation account.) A comparison of strategies and roles
among different appropriation accounts could validate the findings of this study or
reveal that different accounts require modified behavior by budget participants. These




CNO (Chief of Naval Operations)
CPAM (CNO Program Analysis Memoranda) - An overview of the approved Five-Year
Defense Program as modified by budget decisions.
CPFG (CNO Program and Fiscal Guidance) - Fiscal guidance targets for use in the
preparation of fiscally constrained CPAMs and to provide initial programming policy
guidance for POM development.
DG (Defense Guidance) - Authoritative statement of fundamental strategy, issues and
rationale, as well as the guiding document for Services and Defense Agencies in the
preparation of their Program Objective Memoranda.
DOA (Department of Agriculture)
DOD (Department of Defense)
DPS (Decision Package Sets) - Tentative budget decisions made by the Secretary of
Defense after a budget review with the Office of Management and Budget.
FY (Fiscal Year)
FYDP (Five-Year Defense Program) - The official program which summarizes the
Secretary of Defense approved plans and programs for the" Department of Defense.
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff)
JPAM (Joint Program Assessment Memorandum) - A document prepared annually by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the Secretary of Defense which provides
recommendations on the joint force program within the fiscal guidelines.
JSPD (Joint Strategic Planning Document) - Provides the advice of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the President, National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on the
military strategy and force structure required to attain the national security objectives
of the United States.
OMB (Office of Management and Budget)
OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense)
NCBG (Budget Evaluation Group)- Responsible for the preparation of Department of
the Navy Budget guidance and the control and coordination of budget submission.
NA VCOMPT or NCOMPT (Comptroller of the Navy)
PBD (Program Budget Decision) - A Secretary of Defense decision in prescribed format
authorizing changes to a submitted budget estimate and the Five-Year Defense
Program.
PDM (Program Decision Memorandum) - A document which provides decisions of the
Secretary of Defense on Program Objective Memorandums and the Joint Force
Memorandum.
PE (Program Element) - Describes the mission to be undertaken, identifies the
organizational entities who will perform the mission assignment, estimates costs.
POM (Program Objectives Memorandum) - A memorandum submitted to the Secretary
of Defense by the Secretary of a Military Department of the Director of a Defense
Agencv which recommends the total resource requirements within the parameters of
the published Secretary of Defense fiscal guidance.
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PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) - Strategy is developed in
consideration oT threat and policv. Force obiectives are developed to support the
strategy. Programs are developed to provide, on an orderly basis, ships, aircraft,
weapon systems and manpower over a period of time, with due consideration of the
total cost to the nation. Lastly, funds are budgeted in such a manner as to obtain the
forces and weapon systems within the resources that the Congress provides.
RDT&E (Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation)
SECDEF (Secretary of Defense)
SECNA V (Secretary of the Navy)
SSPs (Sponsor Program Proposals) - Assignment of funds to programs by resource
sponsors using fiscal and program guidance.
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